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ECONO~lIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOP~IE~"T •
IN KOREA, 1963-1967.
David Cole and Princeton Lyman
-- General Introduction
Recent Korean experience presents an intriguing subjec~ for study because
•what appeared to be an economically and politically sick country has almost
overnight become healthy, growing and reasonably stable. As recently as 1960
and 1961 there were student revolts and military coups, economic growth was
decelerating, and the country was heavily dependent on economic and military
assistance from~.the United States, so that many wonde,red whether I~he cr.>ulltry
\
could continu'~ 1,1) exist even as a sort of permanent ward of the United States.
Now, in 1967: the economy is growing at a truly r~markable rate, the political
system shotvs evidence of increasing strength and stability, ther.e is 0r!"n db":
. cussion of terminating U. S. assistance in a few years and South Korea is assum-
ing a position in world affairs cO~lensurate with its size and position.
the fundamental question which one inevitably ask3 ~h~n confronted with
these facts is: what has caused the change? Is it an accident, or just a
temporary a:1i~rra.t'foi{! Is it the effects of a particular individ~tal or small
group who have transformed the society and given it new purpose ,and drive?
Does it simply reflect the rpturn to a normal state of affairs for a country
and people that were pushed into a state of disequillibrium by foreign occupa-
tion, world war, partition, a civil war in which both sides were pawns in
the Cold War - certainly enough disturbing Eor~es to unsettle anycountry1
In our judgement there are no simple a~swers to the resurgence of South
Korea froln the doldrums and decline that occurred at the beginning of the 1960's.
It has been a complex politico-economic process which has involved a mixture
of good judgement and good fortune. While many of the principal actors on the
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stage have not been outstandIng, they have performed well, and certain under-
. .
lying characteris~ics of environment and the social system have been favorable •
.. -Jut the basic factors for change have been the transfer of political leader-
ship to a new and very different g~neration, the transformation of the frame-
'work of economic po~icies in a way wi~ich tapped the dilige~ce and skills of
.,..~
the people, and the interaction of the economic and political forces which have
"awn strength frou~ each other. It will be our objective in what follot-lS to I
clescribe and to explain what has happened in Ko~ 2~ during this re~atively
brief period. It is. our hope that this may cOtl.,.1bute to the general under-
standing of the political and economic uevelopment processes and give encourage-
ment for other countries ~~ich are facing the prospects of such a transformation.
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Summary of Korean Political Oeve1opment 1963 - 1967.
In the first fifteen years of its postwar independence, 1948-1963, Korea
experienced four different types of government. The present government, estab-
lished in 1963, emerged from the leadership of a military coup which had brought
a sudden end to the most open and exuberant but short~live4 period of Korean
democracy, 1960-61. Korean po~itics since 1963 has been characterized most
significantly by the transition under this government from military back to
civilian rule and the .restoration of a framework permitting open and generally
democratically controlled political activity•
. The transition .~n both cases has been gradual and often uneven and vacil-
·1
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lating. Yet the overall trend has been toward a more open system and an ~nviron-h .
ment generally more compatible with co~peting interests than the closely controlled
military government of 1961-62~or even the first two years' of the pr~~er:t govrr.n-
mente Major institutions - parties, press and Government - have operated increas-
ingly within this framework despite occasional and very notable 'exceptions. There
have been otller closely related deve16pments on a more broad front: a gro'o1ing
sense of stability and confidence in Government, an energetf:~ and successful
economic development effort, and a gradual moderation and broadening of Korea's
previously narrow focus of foreign relations.
The prospects for such deve1opment~ in 1963 were not auspicious. The~e
were some positive elements pres~nt. A great deal of pressure had been built
up throughout the postwar years of the ~ee regime for economic. modernization
and political change. Increases in education~urbanization and the influx of
. foreign aid-all very substantial before 1950 but much accelerated by the Korean
War and its aftermath-had contributed greatly to popular perceptions and atti-
tudes in this regard. The i\pril 1960 revolution morevovcr ushered in an.
exuber~nt if somewhat turbulent period of political democracy.
I
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activity and much 9f the growth of new ideas that filled the days of 1960-61.
It did not, as po~n~ed out below, entirely reverse them. But the coup brought
once again to the fore the deep-seated conflict between authoritarian and
democratic tendencies in pos~~ar Korean political ideology. The cong1ict
continued as a prominent force. after 1963 with strong auth~ritarian influences
•remaining in the new Government.
Additionally, Korea lacked in 1963 any stable cohesive civilian groups,
bound together by class, religion or mutual economic interest, who could give
continuity and substance to political debate and operations in a civilian structure.
The absence of class or other cleavages was in many ways an advantage. But it
also tended to promote factionalism, opportunism, and extreme fluidity among
political groups. There was furthermore a certain despair in postwar Korean
politics, reflecting anxiety and uncertainty over the yery meanin8 of ~ South
Xorean state and manifesting itsel~ often in an emotional but fatalistic or
even·se1f-destructive approach to politics and the solution to political issues.
l~e coup of- 1961 had aggravated this despair among many.
Finally the regime which took power in 1963, with its origins in the mil-
itary coup and its narrowly won (and contested) electoral victory, was an un-
popular and in many minds illegitimate one. For several years, the opposition
. .
would be bent more on bringing about its collapse than its replacement in .the
next scheduled election.
Against this pic~~re, there were several fact~rslclosely inter:related,
whicn operated to DrIng aDout the spectrum or positIve developments and greater
~
atab!lity ~rllich subsequently occurred. The"principa1 determining factors were
five:
1. The origins and outlook of the new Government leadership and that
of ~~e ~joi elements of opposition.
~s-
2. The decision by th~ Government to use economic development as the
principal ba~is for legitimizing its power and for developing a national
consensus in its favor.
3. 'the em~rgence of strong political leadership within the Government
and over tlle Government party by the President, Park Chung~Hee.
4. The influence ori the Korean Government of the UJited States.
s. The strength 'of popular sentiment for'democratic government and
reaction to authoritarian controls.
1. The nature and origin of the leadership:
The leaders of the military coup in 1961 overthrew the government of Chang~
Myon(which had won the first election after the fall of Syngham Rhee) , arrested
all that government's leaders, arrested or detained many of the leaders of the
April 1960 revolution, and forbade any further political activity by most prev-
. 10us1y prominent politicians. For all its actions against the political ~orces
that had succeeded to the 1960 revo~ution, ho\V'ever, the military coup did not
represent a return to the pre-1960 order. The m.ilitary ins.titutiol'l in Korea
,a post. KO'reat'l tolar·' crerttion,· and the attitudes"of its leaders. a9
was predominantly much a .product of the postwar period as the generation of
" fo
students which had led the revolution against ~h~e.
'the leaders of the coup in 1961 saw themselves, and were in fact in many
ways, the heirs of the 1960 revolution rather than its reactionary counter-
point. The ideology of the coup leaders was strongly nationalistic, pragmatic
and mn.:A3ciial. There was no deep concern with theory or systems, except for
I' ',...... .
carried it forward more forcefully, a disdain of the negative dependence on
the U. S. and the emotional but frustrating harangu~s about reunification
that characterized and monopol:i.zcd the Rhee period. Their ultimate success
in establishing rapport and later grudging recognition and support from the
they lay in tht.ir . to do the things that
'.
•
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a new generation wanted done but was ambiv~lent about, and their almost bull-
headed confidence, ~ven if som~tim~s misplaced, in their ability and the ability
of the nation to do so.
The military also embodied a certain populist character. The army was
basically conscript, and so large as to ~ake military serv!ce nearly universal -
though rural youth probably serve more universally than ur6an youth who have
access to student and other deferments. It also retained a great popularity
from its role in the Korean War while lacking any long tradition of internal
harassment. But perhaps most important, the officer corps was. largely draWll
from rural families, rising in status through the mi~itary as an alternative
to the mor~ prestigious path of particular high schools and universities in
Seoul. In "the early months after the coup, i:l~e junta made exceptional, if nlis-
placed, efforts to try to assist rural households. While the practical tasks
of industrialization, the proximity to urban elites, and the more demanding
and less popular aspects of agricultural policy tended over time to reduce
this direct identffieation, the leadership's basic line of communication to,
And interest in the rural 'areas was never severed.
On the opposite side, the leaders of the opposition in this period con-
tinued to b~ essentially of another generation. They harked back to the early
politics of the independence movement and early post-independence period. They
were the groups, not without nostalgic effect, who spoke of the ideals of dem-
ocraey and economic development in abstract terms but who symbolized in their
outlook and mannerisms the pre-revolutionary generation. They had netther par-
ticular techniques nor very clear policy predtlections. Their support, more-
over, was diverse. There ware 'politicians of various s tripes removed from .in-
fluence by the military, ex-military who had been pushed out by powar struggles
within that group, students moved by idealism and frustration (but who would
have also been frustrated under the opposition parties' rule as they had been
-7-
of their early cooperation with the military, and the press traditionaliy in
opposition to Gover~ment but without loyalty .to any sp~cific opposition insti-
tution or party. There were no congealed labor, business or farm interests
whichcOw:d add substance and direction to issues of economic policy or which
.. ~:" t :"
could represent a basis of popular support if the leaders could ever attain
..
power. The opposition forces were a catch-all. And as the Government increas-,
ingly succeeded in holding out pragmatic opportunities for various groups in
the economic sphere, the supporters began to drop off one by one or greatly
moderate their tone.
In effect while the government leadership was mistrusted and held largely
in disrespect for the manner in which it had come to power, there was no group
that offered a more attractive alternative. The government, for all its resented
authoritarianism, had'become willy nil1y the repository of all the revolutionary
J
hopes of 1960.
2. Commitment of the Government to Economic Dcve1opmcnt~s-!J~-1L~se of Political
Strate~
One of the forces released by the April 1960 revolution was a change in
orientation and approach to economic problems. Concern over economi~ problems
had grown sharply in the latter part of the Rhee days and became the focus of
muchO general1y expressed resentment. A new emphasis on economic development
was,thus the one line of policy that links the Interim and Democratic govern-
ments of 1950-~1, the military government of 01961-63 and the present regime.
In this r~spect, the military and successor governments were very much heirs
of the April 1960 revolution. In his later defense of the military coup,
General - later President - Park emphasized first,of all the economic situation
,of thf! country and recounted all the grievances that had become familiar ... rally-
ing cries of intellectual and student discontent during the Rhee regime: the
large amount or foreign aid "frittered a,,,ay" J the over'-emphasis on consumer
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goods, the depressing effect of aiJ-financcd agricultural imports on domestic
agriculture, 'the he~vy dependence of the budg~t on.aid receipts, the inefficient
'.
.management of state-run enterprises, and the lack of l~ng-range planning.
Initially the leadership's emphasis on these eco~omic matters was an extension I
of its generally strong nationalist orientation, one of the~essential elements in I
its overall desire to give the nation ·greater independence and greater dignity.
Gradually, how~ver, the emphasis acquired a different kind of political signif-
icance. As pressures from various sources were leading the Government into
greater acceptance of a civIlian structure and democratic forms of government,
the leadership began to focus more directly on the use of economic development
programs as thp. basis for achieving popular support and broad political backing.
The strategy that developed was to'rern{'l~e, even by forcible pressure if' necessary,
. • I -
certain key obstacles t~ econo~ic modernization and to create ~hereby an economic
·momentum that would attract popular support and in its results compensate for
the earlier strong-arm measures and other unpopular aspects of the regime.
The strategy in this regard was not a foregone conclusion in 1963. Many
. .
elements in the Government resisted the trend toward more democratically
styled politir.s and were prepared ~o continue power by force. Many of the early
junta memb~rs particularly resented the growing power of civilian bureaucrats
that the economic emphasis brought about. Furthermore, there was the tempta-
°tion'to turn to external fronts rather than domestic issues to capture popular
,attention - if not a return to the anti-Japanese, anti-North Korean xenophobia
of the Rhee regime, th~n possibly a demarche in the direction of neu~ratism
and contacts with North Korea which many in fact suspected might happen after
1961 ( a certain degree of anti-U.S. feeling was in fact whipped up by the
Govern~ent in 1961). Finally, many persons in the Govcrnment,just as many
outside of it, were uneasy over Korea's real economic future. These elements
eont~nued to urge -- as late as 1966 -- some relapse into the more traditlona1
•
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reliance on increments of U.S. aid as a touchstone of Korean security rather
than growing economic'independence. But the importance of economic development
in tlle thinking of Koreans by this period, the growing pressures for more democratic
governm~nt, and perhaps of key importance the successes becoming evident in the
.
economic sphere by 1965 all moved the Government toward car~ying through the
program of economic modernization and using it as the key to being able to
live with, shape and influence a civilian political structure.
~~onQmic'~evelopmenthad political value to the Government in respect to
•• 0: "'i:'
the widespread concern over living standards and national wealth that had devel-
oped in Korea by this time, but also came to be related to the Government's
response to other major issues in Korean politics. One of these was the char-
acter of Korea's foreign relations. One of the earliest nationalistic objectives
of the leadership after 1961'was to reduce Korean dependence on the U.S. and to
'e1imina te what one Korean scholar would la ter t\~1:~:ln Korea's "mendicant mentali ty".
In the early period after the coup, attempts to gain non-U.S. sources of financing
for Korean development were crude and hurried but met with ~ome success in estab-
lishing economic relations with Germany, international lending bodies and some
other commercial capital sources. After several basic economic reforms had
been undertaken in 1964 and 1965, and once settlement of relations with Japan'
'was achieved, Korea was in a position to attract really sizeable flows of non-
u.S. capital. By 1967 these inflows were making Korea increasingly independent
of concessionary U. S. aid•. The rapid growth of exports, moreov~r, which the
relations unkno\~ in the previous decade. Korea's trading partners tripled
between 1961 and 1966.
These factors contributed greatly to a new vibrancy in Korean foreign rela-
tions in this period: diplomatic forays into Southeast Asia, increasing efforts
.::
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independent dealings.with Japa~, and ~nitia~ives in Asian political organizations
such as ASPAC. The' despatch of troops to Vietnam gave a great fillip to these
,
efforts, but that action too had a different more positive character for Koreans
because of the simultaneously changing economic relationships with the U. S.
Economically and politically, the~efore, Korea was emerging.fro~ its traditional
•isolationist position. And tids earned the Government considerable credit at
home.
Another long troublesome and touchy issue in Kore,an politics, which was
brought into the framcwo~k of economic empha~;is, was the questio~ of rcunifica-
tion. Gradually after 1963 and finally quite explicitly by 1966, the Government
equated the possibilities for new steps toward reunification with the progress
of economic modernization in South Korea. The time for new initiatives on
unification, argued the Government, would be in the 1970's \-Then South Korea's
economic position vis-a-vis the North would be greatly enhanced, ·indeed would
b~ superior to the North's. This was a ve=y new approach in Korean politics
to the reunification question. It was perhaps the leading example of how nu\jor
political issues in this period came to revolve around the Government's economic
emphasis.
The programs in economic development had two very distinct effects them-
selves on the civilianization and democrati~ation of Korean politics. One
was that the complex requirements of economic policy formation and implemen-
tAtion led the leadership to turn increasingly to civilian elements for ~xper-
tise. The coup' h.;d already swept atolay for political reasons much of the older
senior group or bureaucrats and this opened th~ high positions to a newer gen-
. .
eration, educated in different types of schools and thousands of whom had
been trained abroad during the 1950's. At the senior level, a stability in
cabinet membership from 1964-1967 was maintained in shorp contrast to the
revolving chairs or k~y ministerial posts in the previous two years. In time,
,
•
I
I.
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bureaucracy and key civilian administrators becane one of the most important
facfor~ in the planning and carrying through of Government policies - while
~..• ' 'JJ~'I!
at the same time lessening E~ecutive dependence on military personnel and even
on tts own party whose leadership was largely drawn from military and former
politician circles.
A second effect was that the approach toward planning and the ~olicies
pursued by the Government in the economic field led to a reduction in the ~xten-
sive di~ect Governmen~ control over production, investment and foreign tr~de and
opened up considerable new~areas for private initiative and action. The reasons
behind these policies were purely pragmatic rather than ideological, but the
effect wa's to make Government more a partner with private business in economic
development than a director. The effect on the development of more independent
pluralistic interest groups can be expected to be gradual, but the imnediate
. effect of generating private inititative and action was noticeable in the level
of increa~ed private savings and investment and the volume of private commercial
capital inflows. On the Government side, these policies eliminated ipso facto
many traditional forms of Government corruption and favoritism and thereby
many of the earlier sources of criticism. While alternate sources of under-
the-table revenue were developed, the general economic system was considerably
. freed from the more pervasive types of political manipulation.
. r'The gen~ral strategy of the.~~vernment in using economic development as
the base of its .political power succeeded by the end of its first four years
ia offiee. For two- year&, until 19&5, Governmeftt seeurlty and authority r~t:~
..
largely on the presence of force and the weakness of its opponents. The issue
of normalization of relations with Japan, wh~ch ~ame to symbolize beth the Govern-
ment's determination to Pu!;~ through its major policy r~forms, and ~m the other
lide all the res'1stance in the country - political and psychological • to a
major new turn i tln(')k. was'
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confrontation between the Government and a unified popular opposition. After
the settlement with japan in 1965, ettention turned increasingly and with rather
amazing speed to what were becoming sizeable, in some areas, spectacular evidences
or real economic growth. By this time the Government too felt more confid~~t,~:
and consequently somewhat less concerned about the activiti~s and the potential
challenge from its opponents.
In 1967, President Park ran for reelection, and capped this general strategy
by campaigning almost exclusively on his record of economic achievements and
the promise pf further deveiopment under The secon~ Five Year Plan which was
,
just beginning. He won by an impressive majority over the same opponent whom
be had so narrowly defeated four years earlier. Gains in urban support also
showed that the Government had overcome serious sources of opposition to it among
the more articulate gn1ups in the society. Without doubt in the minds of most
·voters lingering resentment over military influence, recently uncoyered cases
of corrupti~n$ and the still strong authoritarian element that showed, if less
frequently and more subtly, in Governm~nt actions were subordinated to the
momentum of material achievements and general modernization of the c~untry,
the inc~eased political stability, and the evidence of concomitant growing
government moderation represented in the incumbent regime •
.3. Emergence of Presidential Leadership:
the strategy of emphasis on economic development as the prerequisite, to
national strpn~thening genral1y emerged by 1967 as the chief issue in the
campaign and the real test of the legitimacy o~ the regime. But in the interim,
·the most conspicuous political struggles that had taken place revolved - with
only one great exception (the Japan issue) - around the relative degree of
authoritarian control exercised by the Government. If this issue had not been
.tttied ;in favor of moderation, it is questionable that the degree of national
1
·1
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been achieved, or that· these programs wo~lp·have even been able to receive the
same emphasis· within 'the Goverluuent. Two_forc~s acting upon the political mood
of the country in this regard -- U.S. influence and popular sentiments about
democracy -- are dIscussed in sections 4 and S below. But the ab~lity and will- .
ingness of the Government to accommodate itself to these fotces rested very much
..
on the reaction and attitudes of the President.
Park Chung-Hee was from the "older generation" of coup leaders, the one-
star generals who gradually took over the reins of the Military Government from
the colonels and gave the new Government its essentially managerial and output
oriented cast. Park lacked any measure of charisma or. popular appeal. Ris
strength lay in his resoluteness and later his ability to balance and playoff
the divisive factions in his Own entourage as well as outside the Government.
More pragmatically than ideologically - for Park himself tended more toward
. -authoritarian discipline than democracy in politics - he became a source for
moderating the more extreme elements within the Government.
Synghman Rbee had used the Korean Presidency in his twelve year incumbency
as an independent institution, and had only reluctantly established a Government
party at all several years after attaining office. Park had a Government party
from 1963, but he too made the Presidency independent of anyone source of sup-
port.- He carefully balanced the factions within the party - one ~f which, deriv-
"ing from the early coup leadership, was strongly authoritarian - created several
. different and competing sources of intelligenc~ and follow-up (e.g., the Army,
;CIA. and specl.al assistants).,. and reB.ed also on independent civilian adminh-
trators in the Cabinet who acqUired real power in their extended tenure of
office and who for several years were not even asked to join the party.
The key economic administrator, the Deputy Prime Minister, was kept on in fact
OVer the objections of most Government party members. In this process of
, to his the po~.,er
'.
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authoritarian e1ements'witllin the Governmen~ and the Governme~t party. Gradually
as he gained confidence in the Government's progress, he held back also from
overly oppressing the Oppositi9n and came to find the intricacies of constitu-
tiona1 rule generally to his advantage.
The effect of this strategy was somewhat to weaken the Government party,
..
divorce it more from involvement in establishing Government policy and deprive
it of a very constructive role. On the other hand, the more opportunistic,
- autocratic, and in some cases purely selfish elements in the Party were also
checked from leading the Government down the disastrous path that Rhee's
Liberal Party had taken it in the late 1950's.
Another effect was to strengthen considerably the policy role and the
professional orientation of the bureaucracy and to institutionalize procedures
and programs that would later be more invulnerable to the vicissitudes of
party poti.tics. As ~~~~ted out earlier, the working alliance between the
Executive an~ a technically oriented bureaucracy proved to be one of the
most important elements in carrying through major Government programs.
Finally, Park relied l~ss and less on direct military support. Retiring
military officers still often receive comfortable slots in government-owned
corporations or within the Party, and the Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps
,continues to play one of the key roles in internal intelligence and even
politics. ~rm~ sympathy and support still lies clearly with the regime.
Sut the military as a whole retired from politics after 1963.
In 8Uft\; for a ~lnation of reasons- _. perSOfttll, Itrasmatie, ftftt!Oftt\U.s-tle;
and as pointed out below the influence'from the U.S. - President Park emerged
as a major force leading the country back to civilian institutions of control,
arresting the more extreme presdures for authoritarianism, and strengthening
the economic development-oriented thrus t of the regime_,
4. u.s. Influence
The discussion above has stressed the pragmatic rather than the ideological
1
l
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motivation behind much" of the developments of this period. One important factor
' .. ~ .
that was very much ideological in content, how~ver, was the influence of the.
U.S. It is doubtful that any countr~r has been bound up quite as deeply with
another independent country as the U.S. has been with Korea since 1945; With
. regard to its effect on the events of 1963-67, U.S. in£luen~e was of two kinds •
•
!brought the American Military Government from 1945-48, the direct involvement
in the Korean War, and the massive aid programs afterward, the U.S. had shaped
- extensively Korea's education system, its postwar po1iti~nl values and ideology,
and in several cases the attitudes and abilities of key groups. An almost religious
attachment to democratic principles was taken over from American values by post-
war intellectuals and students and-they being too acute to miss the contradictions
between the slogans of the Free World and the fact of authoritarian rule in their
own country - became fGr them both a rallying cry against Governm~nt and, in
harder times, one more counsel of despair. Similarly, the U.S. trl tned from
the ground up the Korean military; thera is scarcely a senior officer who has
not been through an American staff college. Thousands of civilian government
workers also received training in the U.S. and many more were long exposed to
u.s. advisors. If a strong authoritarian trend exists in Korean political ideol-
ogy, its equally strong counterpart has been nurtured almost from the beginning
.by the influx of U.S. concepts an~ values •.
A second more specific U.S. influence operated on Korean politics in this
period. Immediately after the coup and with cpnsistency throughout the next
two- ~crrs-, the- U.S. GOverument trtadc- very clear its" position in favor of a ntatn
to civilian government and used its influence in this directioti. ~~en the military
leadership wavered in this regard one last time in ~963, the U.S. reaction was
sharp and outspoken. Some Koreans feel {t was a deci~ive influence. After
the establishment of the new government U.S. influence continued to be important
in t~e general direction of political development. Opportunities for exerting
,.-
\
."
this influence i~proved moreover.
-16-
Relations had been strained between the Military •
Government and the U~S. After 1963 relations between the new Government and the
u.s. became increasingly close. In an atmosphere of growing mutual confidence U.S.
counsel was often solicited and quite forthrightly given on many crucial domestic
issues. AI~ost invariably when a crisis developed between Government and opposi-
,
tion,or Government and students, U.S. counsel was for accommodation, for actions
that would maintain constitutional government and that would help obviate a resort
to force or extreme suppression. U.S. relations, moreover, were closer with the
more moderate elements within the Government than with the more extreme elements.
U~S. representatives lectured on the value of preserving balance and drew attention
on more than one occasion to unfavorable international reaction that would be
generated by any expressively dictatorial practices.
The level of U.S. political influence in this regard derived from its
.overal1 importance to Korea militarily, dip:.omatical1y, and economically. But
the U.S. was also in a position to support specifically through both positive
and negative incentives in the aid program, the Government's economic emphasis.
And U.S. policy in this period was more unified on the importance of such
emphasis in Korea vis-a-vis strictly military and security objectives than it
·had been in any previous period since 1950. This was not lost on the Koreans
and increasingl, coincided with their ~wn priorities.
s. Popular Reaction to Authoritarianism:
No analysis of postwar Korean political development can fail to take into
account the inlportance of the continuous struggle between authoritarianism and
democracy in Korean politics. There is no prewar tradition of democracy in
Korea, but it has been absorbed into the political culture ~~th amazing rapidity
and depth since 1945. It is a very lively issue. The institutions which have
played thernost critical overt role in this regard and which keep it alive are
the press and the students - both influenced by and often tIle most effective
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outlet for the intell!:~ntsia.
The defi~itive ~attles over the limits of government power under the present
regime involved di~ectly these two group. Anti-Government student demonstrations
in 1964 on the Japan issue, which were goaded on by the press, had finally led to
a declaration of martial law. As the price for lifting mar~ial law, the Government
rlemanded two laws aimed at ~ontrolling these groups in the future. The ,laws,
known as the Press Ethics and Campus Protection laws became the focus of'a nation-
wide politi~al struggle. The resistance from the press and the intellectuals
proved unyielding and more effcctive in this case than on the issue behind the
demonstrations tllemselves. Even with a dccisive legislative majority in the
Assembly the Government felt obliged to back down. The Press Ethics law was
passed ~ut never enforced. Thc C8rnpu~ Protection bill was witlldrat~. These
were criti-:al battlcs. ~ey' affectcd the most importqnt a:ld influential civilian
'political institutions in the coun£~s,: those through which opposition and criti-
_.. - .
clsm of the Government could find ready and most influential expression. Though
the struggles over autocratic controls would continue, thes~ battles appeared
to represent the turning point in the fight to establish the basic premises of
an open political system.
In these confrontations, and later after the ~rregularities in the Assembly
eleetions of 1967, it was elear that a gross violation of politieal demoeraey
represented one of the few unifying and mobilizing forces behind diverse oppo-
lition elements. Tne Government soon found it prudent to avoid this kind of
eon£r~t\t:J.ettwher-ever ~s-!b-le end to-~ eat\tro-l !ftS-tead-t~ ~lO--P-!ftt
..
genuine eonsensus in areas such as economie progress and a growing desire for
t
I
politieal stability.
of disagreement bctween the ~overnment and the populaee were narrowed. Struggles
over po1itieal democracy ~lUS beeame fewer and of 1css grand seale after 1964,
and -- judging from the reaction to the'purportedly rigged Assembly elections
J
I
-18-
of 1967 -- somewhat defused of their earlier emotional furor. There was in sum
,
by 1967 more ,c:c:nf'i~..nce in the system even among 'the more traditional voices of
• ,··· ...·;;",/-'·'!;II{
~istrust.
In the interplay of these five factors du_ing this period, it is clear
that critical to the success of the Government's political strategy, and to
the development of political stability generally, were the evidences of
economic change that were becoming apparent as early as 1965 and the begin-
ning of an economic mo~entum 'that began to affect Korean attitudes on a wide
variety of political llnd economic issues. The successful economic development
of this period constitutes an important story in itself. It also, however,
helps' give insight into the nature of the Government's political s~r~tegy in
. , .,. , I
this period and quite significantly into the type of interaction between
Gove~nment direction and popular participation that took place in the economic
spherr:.
.t.
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Summary of Economic Develapment and Its Causes.
South Korea since 1963 has attained one of 'the highest grouth rates of
national product in recent world experience and has entered upon a structural
transformation leading toward a modern, industrial, self-supporting economy.
It has been rare for a country not confronted by some speci~l circumstances
8UC~ as discovery of a major new national resource, or spillover effects from
a nearby war to achieve such rapid progress. Admittedly Korea has benefited
to some extent from the Vietnam war, especially in 1966 and 1967, but the
period of high growth had started before this and the "Vietnam effects" have
not been large in relation to the changes that have occurred. The main stimuli
of development have been internally generated and they have played upon the
strengths in the Korean environment which in turn have responded vigorously.
Growth of Output
South Korea's real gross national product has more than doubled since
the end of the Korean War in 1953. During the same period the population has
increased from about 21.5 million to 29.2 million in the 1966 census, so that
real GNP per capita has risen by roughly two-thirds since 1953. Much of this
impr~vement in output per capita has occurred in rec!nt years (1963-66) when
the growth rate has averaged 9.6 percent per annum. This is in marked contrast
to the prece~lng four years, when average annual growth was only 3.5 percent, ,
and is even well above the post-war recovery period (1953-58).
Th~ ree~fit growth bas oeen manifested In ~ dramatIc Improvement in primary
production and an accel1erated expansion of lndudtrial (secondary) production.
The tertiary or service sectors have tended to move with the overall growth
rate. In both the primary and secondary sectors there has been diversification
of production, but at the same time continued substantial growth of the tradi-
tional conunodities. Thus the production of grains has g'one up by 3.5 to 4 percent.,
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TABLE r
Growth ~f GNP, 1953-1966
GNP in Constant 1965 Grotvth Rate
Prices (billion Won) (Percent)
1953 421.9 ·0
1954 447.4 6.0
1955 474.5 6.1
1956 480.5 1.2
l'!
1957 522.7 8.8
1958 551.7 5.5
Average 1954-58 5.5
1959 575.8 4.4
1960 589.1 2.~
1961 613.6 4.2
1962 635.0 3.5
Average 1959-62 3.6
1963 69~.0 9.1
1964 750.3 8.3
1965 805.9 7.4
1966 913.8 13.4
Average 1963-66 9.6
Source: Bank of Korea, Revision of National Accounts, 1953-66
..
per year, but com~ercial crops and fishing have gone up much faster. Similarly
textiles and other light industries have expanded steadily but a number of
',- new industries such as chemicals, oil refining and basic metals have grown by
leaps and bounds.
"
r" '.
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The main impetus for growth appears to have been quite different for
the two sectors! Primary production has responded to a sizeable injection
of new productive inputs which have 'been channeled to the producers through
an extensive network of government agencies.
.
Improved organization.• to deliver
the inputs in the right amounts at the right tima and greater effectiveness
in stimulating the use of new inputs have been critical factors in raisi,ng
agricultural production.
In the manufacturing area a pervasive system of import controls and end
user allocation of imported intermediate goods has been sharply curtailed.
This has meant increased reliance on market forces and greater room for
private initiative. But there was relatively little change in the level
or co~position of input use after these changes. The main positive stimulus
for increased output was a generalized system of export incentives that
resulted in rapid growth of exports of manufactured goods. This was acco~-
plished initially by fuller and more efficient use of existing productive
facilitiestbut, as more plnnts approached capa~i~y operation, eventually led
to substantial new investment and the reappearance of shortages in the
infrastructure areas of power and transportation.
Thus the government had a major and direct role in bringing about'
• change in the productive technology in the primary sector, but in
manufacturing it was a more indirect role of creating incentives for the
growth of demand and reducing barriers to private response.
.,
.,
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TABLE II
Percentage Shar~s and Rates of Growth
of GNP by Industrial Group** 1
.
Average Shares of GNP
1954-58 1959-62 1963-66
Avera~ Rates of Growth
1954-58 1959-62 1963-66 1954-66
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries 45.8 41.8 39.4 4.0 .8 8.4. 4.2
,,',
Secondary Industry* 14:tf: 18.5 22.9 13.9 9.5 15.2 l~.•J~
. ",,'i'"
Tertiary Industry 39.4 39.7· 37.7 4.7 4.6 7.8 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.5 3.6 9.6 6.2
'. *Includes mining, quarrying,~~~facturing,construction, electricity, water
and sanitary services.
**Based on Gross National Product series in 1965 constant market prices.
Source: Bank of Korea, Revision of National Account, 1953-65 •
..
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Primary Production
While the recent record of expansion of primary production has been re-
markable, there are ewo tempering considerations. In part the accomplishments
since 1963 are made doubly impressive by comparison with the preceding four
years when there was practically no growth of real primary ~utput. This poor
recotd was due in part to adverse weather conditions, especially in 1962,
when .output was clearly below the trend. Part of the recovery in the following
two years may have reflected a return to the longer run trend. The second
consideration is that the ~tatistics on agricultural crop production have been
revised substantially in recent years to reflect new and better survey data.
These revisions may well have some bias in the direction of high estimates
for the current or recent years and low estimates for earlier periods, but
it is extremely difficult to test for such bias. Neither of these sources of
'possible distortion is likely to be of sufficient magnitude to invalidate
the conclusion that growth of primary production has been high over the past
four years, but merely to indicate that it may not have been quire as sharp
• cha~ge from the preceding four years as the statistics indicate.
. .
MUch of the impressive growth of primary output which h~s occurred in
recent years has been in the non-grain crops, in livestock, sericulture and
fisheries •. This has resulted in a doiine of the relative importance of grains
in total primary production and a more diversified patter~ of production. It
also indicates an increased commercialization of the primary sectors and
pi-obab-ly 4 \)ettff balanced diet for the popull~ton As a wnole •
..
The evolVing structure of primary output is indicated by the relative
Ihares of major components of total output for 1960 and 1963 and estimates
of total domestic output for' 1965.
Grain production has accounted for roughly 60 percent of total primary
output (see Table III), with rice averaging about 45 percent and the winter
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TABLE III
• J
S~ares of Total Output of the Primary Sectors
(Va~ue in billions of won at current prices)
1960 1963 1965. ..
Value % Value 1- Value 1-
1. Rice 52.0 49.3 .128.9 .49.3 142.6 39.0
2. Barley and Wheat ~ 15.1 36.8 14.1 ~ 62 ..6 17.1
~ub ~ota1 67.9 . 64.4 165.7 63.4 205.2 56.1
3. Vegetables, Pulses
and Potatoes '13.1 12.4 38.4 14.7 64.6 17.7
4. Fruit 2.2 2.1 4.0 1.5 7.9 2.2
s. Industrial Crops
..1.:1 -1d ~ 2.6 14.3 3.9
Sub total 18.2 17.2 49.3 18.8 86.8 23.8
6. Livestock and
Sericulture 8.8 8.3 29.0 11.1 40.1 11.0
7. Forestry 6.8 6.4 9.3 3.6 17.7 4.8
8. Fisheries 3.8
-l.d ~ -M 16.2 4.4
Sub total 19.4 18.4 46.4 17.8 74.0 20.2
TOTAL 105.6 100.0 261.4 100.0 366.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Input-o'ltput tables for 1960 and 1963 and sectoral
output estimates for 1965. Rice, barley and wheat output are
adjusted. See Appendix B.
.'
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grains--barley, wheat and rye--about 15 per~ent. All other crops have averaged
20 percent in recent years and the same share is attributable to the combination
of livestock, sericulture, forestry and fis~~ries. Changes in the relative
shares of total output over time are affected by the fact that in 1960 and 1965
rice output was below tbe trend, while in 1963 rice was high but barley and
,
wheat'were low. Still it seems clear that th~ relative share of grains is
declining, while that of the other crops, especially vegetables and industrial
crops, and livestock-sericulture is rising.
A c~earer picture of the relative growth of the different field crops can
be obtained by using average production for several years at the beginning and
end of the period, expressing output values in constant prices and deriving
growth rates. This is done in Tables JY and V for the main categories of farm
crops. It is now seen that the compouridannua1 growth rate for crop production
from 1960-61 to 1964-65 was 5.4 percent. Rice, barley and wheat and pulses
had lower growth rates of 3 to 4 percent per annum. At the other extreme were
a 23 percent rate for potatoes, 15 percent for fruit and tobacco and 8 percent
for vegetables. It is noteworthy that both potatoes and tobacco were given
..
special encouragement by the Government in the form of high price supports.
The tables ~lso show that the grains (rice, barley, wheat and other grains)
accounted for only 55 percent of the total growth of real output of farm
crops. Thus the other crops, although they still amounted to less than
one-fourth (23 percent) of the total value of crop output at the end of the
period, contributed nearly half of the g~owth of output between 1960-61 and
1964-65.
Over the 10 year period 'from 1956 to 1965 the cultivated land area in-
creased by 13 percent and the cropped area by nearly 19 percent after taking
.
into aecou~ double cropping. ~fuch of the increase in cultivated area occurred
'.
-26-·
TABLE IY
Average Values of Farm Crops and Shares of
Total Crop Output 1960-61 and 1964-65
1960-61 1964':65
r.Rice' 126,179 63.1 144,795 . 58.7
•
-:
Barley and Wheat 35,592 17.8 41,724 16.9 I
Other Grains 2,496 1.2 3,269 1.3
Pulses 5,682 2.8 6,604 2.7
Potatoes 6,417 3.2 14,708 6.0
Fruit 3,OP 1.5 5,251-, 2.1
Vegetables 16,010 8.0 21~798 8.8
Tobacco . 4,927 2.4 8,639 3.5
TOTAL 200,318 100.0 246,836 100.0
. "" .
'. .. '.
.. .•... .
..
Prices are ayerage prices received by farmers for y.ears 1960-65.
r-· ,.
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Growth Rates and Contribution to Growth of Farm Crop Production
of Major crops lS60-6l to 1964-65
...-
a
Grot-7th Rate Percent of total
.,
growth of output
Rice 3.5.
Bar~ey and Wheat 4.0
Other Grains 7.0
Pulses 3.8
Potatoes 23.0
Fruit 15.0
Vegetables 8.0
.Toba·cco 15.0
TOTAL S.4
• Growth rates are compounded annual rates.
40.0
13.2
1.7
. 2.0
17.8
:.·4.7
12.4
8.0
100.0
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after 1960 and was ma~nly in'the upland areas. l . The expansion of double
«opping on the other hand was mainly on paddy-land and reflected better
water control.
The total supply of fertilizer nutrients is estimated to have increased
as follows:
!!!! Metric Tons"
1961 308,494
1963 350,939
1964 370,064
1965 485,859
1966 534,693
This is an expansion of roughly 80 percent in 5 years. During the same period
there has been a more .than four-fold increase in the usc of pesticides and a
large expansion in the application of limestone to counteract the natural
acidity of Korean soils.
Coincident with this expanded supply of inputs and in part perhaps
creating the demand wus a shift in relative prices in favor of agriculture
after the poor crops of 1962 and 1963. Although the parity ratio of prices
received and p~id by farmers has been gradually declining since the peak in
1963. these have been years of generally high yields so it is surprising that
. farm prices have not declined more rapidly. Government measures to reduce
1 United States' Operations ~Iission to Korea, Rural Development Progra~
!valuaeton Report, Korea 1~67, p. 46
"
.-... ....
Previous ; ~age · -30-
land. These programs not only provided offseason emplojment to those farm(.'r~
who worked on the lan~ development projects, but also gave new land to the
~armers. They'have been both productive and popular.
Secondary Production
~The pattern of growth of secondary production:Js indicated by the industrial
• h
production index. .According' to the index, there was approximately a doubling
of total industrial production between 1954 and 1959 and another 100 percent
increase between 1959 and 1965. Of the three major subdivisions, mining grew
most rapidly in the 1950's and slowed down somewhat in the 1960's. Manufacturing
production grew slowly in 1960, 1961 and again in 1964, but in the other recent
years has expanded by about 15 percent. The index of electricity production
dropped significantly below the general index from 1960 through 1963 which
were years when the shortage of electric power was a serious constraint on
industrial growth. Since 1964 the electricity index has gone up sharply.
Despite this rise in the amount of electricity supplied, shortages were again
'*becoming acute in 1967. This can be seen by comparing the base weights in the
1960 and 1965 manufacturing production index as shown in table 6. These indicate
clearly that although the lighter, consumer goods industries continued to account
for the major share of manufacturing, that share had declined from 60 to 55
percent between 1960 and 1965. Textiles, which are Korea's most important
looks suspicious because this industry has, according to the manufacturing
-[,
I
index" grown more ral , than manufacturin ; as a whole~ It a 'ears that
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TABLE V Industrial Production Index, 1954-1966
(1965=100)
Total Mining Manufacturing Electricity
(toleight) (100) (10.5) (83.3)"' (6.2) ..
'\
1954 24.2 13.6 26.5 27.7
1955 28.9 17.0 32.0 27.0
,I
1956 35.4 22.0 38.7 34.0
-I1957 40.8 29.7' 43.5 40.7
1958 45.0 31.1 48.2 46.5
1959 51.6 43.3 53.6 51.9.
1960 56.2 56.9 56.3 52.• 2 "
1961 59.4 . 64.5 58.6 54.5
.1962 69.5 76.6 68.6 60.8
1963 78.6 87.4 77.6 ' 67.9
1964 84.9 '96.6 82.9 83.1
1965 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1966 117.3 110.8 117.9 119.6
..
r'- . -
!
I
Table VI
Wci~htt\ £0;" C0.:1~':.:1r~rH::: of :!cn:.i~.;:ctudn~ PrCY.!:.:ctlcn
Inlc:::cs ioo: 1$50 and 1965
.,
Lizht Illdu!ltry
Proecs:;et1 fl).:.>t!s
Bcvoerc,scs
Tob.:::cco
Foot'11Cnr, m~~r!n~ ep~~l:'~l
'\1000 ~ml Cod~
Pr!nH~ ro~cl P,~bl!.~1111~
Le~thcr rrQclu~t~
JIcr.vy I~dur. tr:l
Peper ~nd ?E:~ar prccluctG
ltub'bcl:' l'rodl.\~tc
Glasa, Cl~y ~ Stene ~roducts
nl1s1~ ·:Zr.:t31s
Hetnl Fro,!ucts
Ut:~hinZ!rj
Electric ~t~chin~ry
trausport E~ul1'o;t~nt
Sub-Total
l~~O 1965
9.3 8.S
4.2 5.0
4.1 6.9
23.1. 19.3
4.8 3.S
S.7 4.2
1.1 .S
it.D 4.2
.1. .6
1.6 1.9
- --59.9 55.0
3.1 3.7
5.0 3.1
5.9 S.S
3.0 1~.9
9.0 G.S
2.9 4.5
3.1 2.6
2.8 3A
1.3 2.6
3.2 4.3
- -
I.O •.J~ 45.0
--.....-
100.0 100.0 .
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While the growt~ of exports of manufactured goods has provided much of the
stimulus for the expansion of the manufacturing sector, the exports have emanated
mainly from the lighter industries which, as we have seen, have generally been
growing less rapidly than the heavy industries, The- follow~ng table:shows that
.,
.s.1:&n.t.f.i.c.An.t..sJ1.a.r.e.s, of the increased output, fro 'm fishing, minerals other
than coal, processed foods, textiles, plywood, leather and rubber products,
basic chemicals and non-ferrous metals products went into exports between 1963
and 1966. On the other hand relatively little exports originated from any of
the heavier industries except for the basic chemical and non-ferrous metals
sectors. This evidence suggests that if it had not been for the new exports
there would have b~en much slower growth in the light industries. But these
industries in turn generated much of the demand for products from the heavier
industries. Thus the exports have indirectly promoted the expansion of the
heavier industries and a deepening of the industrial structure.
Despite the shift toward heavier industries, the incremental capital-
output ratio in manufacturing has actually declined ill recent years ,to a sur-
prisinsly low level. This suggests that not ~nly has the new investment since
1963 been relatively efficient but that there has probably been fuller use of
previously existing plant and equipment, especially that which was put in place
4
1n the 1959-62 period.
2
. (cDnttmIed) either there lias been a ettange tn fne COmponents oF. thIs
industry group or that the 1960 weight was exc~ssive. Comparison with the input-
output tables for 1960 suggests that the latter is the case, since value-added
'and total output of the gla~~ clay and stone product sectors In the 1-0 tables
,are only 3.0and2.3 perceht of the respective totals for manufacturing.
3The average ratio for the whole period since 1954 has been quite low, ,
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TABLE VII Relative Growth of Exports and.Output from 1963 to 1966
.
P.ercent Change Percent Change Change in Exports as
Sector of Output of Exports Exports as % of 1. of Output
Change in Output 1966
1. Ri~eJ barley &
wheat (polished) 39 1088 3 1
2. Other agriculture 16 51
'l. 5' 2
3. Forestry 54 -10 -2 1
4. Fishery 19 121 48 14
s. Coal 59 9 6 2
6. 'Other minerals 54 194 111 59
. 7. Processed foods 26 233 31 9
8. Bev~rages & tobacco 57 47 2 .2
9. Fibre spinning 29 146 27 10
10. Textile fabrics 71 346 28 15
.;l(~ Finished textile
products 15 628 148 22
12. Lumber & plywood 75 465 78 41
13. Wood products & furni~~.', ':.',
ture -18 97
*
6
14. Paper products 30 59 3 2
15. Printing & publishing 67 34 0 .s
16. Leathe~ & leather
products 13 1848 24 3
17. Rubber prOducts 58 463 26 11
1&. ~ic ~cals
"
811 2S .,
19. Intermediate chemicals 22 -61 - -7 1
20. Finished chemical
products 21 -55 .3
2~. Chemical fertilizer 58 0
..
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TABLE VII Relative Growth of Exports and Output from 1963 to 1966
Percent Change
of Output
~"l1.".
Sector
22. Petroleum &coal
products
23. Ceme"nt
•24. Other ceramic,clay &
stone products
25. Iron & steel
26. Steel products
27. Non-ferrous metals &
primary products
28. Finished metal products
29. Nonelectrical machinery
30. Electrical machinery
31. Transport equipment
32. Miscellaneous manufac-
turing
152
147
35
69
56
4
40
23
132
103
43
Percent Change
of Exports
11
7611
24
25
257
67
-1
142
62
6
o
.. 3
1
12
375
3
o
4
o
o
Exports as
% of Output
1966
o
2
2
o
22
19
2
2
4
2
6
,
.
*Because of the negative change of output this relation is meaningless.
Derived from the 1963 input-output tables and estimates of 1966 output
prepared by the Bank of Korea and 1966 exports by 1-0 sector prepared
by the Eeononlie Planning Bureau.
..
I
I
•
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TABLE VIII
Ratios of Gross Fixed Investment
.to Increase in Valu~ Added
in Manufacturing*
..
1954-58
1959-62
1963-66
1954-66
1.7
2.2
1.3
1.6
*The relations are based on a one year lag in the effect of investment,
i.e. the investment of 1965 is related to the change in value added of 1966 as
compared with 1965.
"
._-_.
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Table IX
Percentage ·Shares of
Expenditures on Gross National Product~:
.
!ill. lliQ.. " ill!. l.2&l 1963 1~~ ~ 196~
-
Private Consumption 88.3 88.8 86.1 89.6 84.8 82.7 83.0 78.5
Government Consumption 12.1 12.1 11.4 11.1 10.6 9.5 9.4 9.3
10'0:"9 97.5 - 9'2:4 ----Total Consumption -100.1; 100.7 95.4 92.2 87.8
Fixed Investment 10.3 10.5 10.6 13.2 15.3 12.4 14.6 20.9
Change in Stocks -.3 .1 1.3 -1.0 4.5 2.8 .1 1.8
-
- -- - 19:8 - - ~~~G~oss Domestic Investment 10.0 10.6 11.9 12.2 15.2 14.7 22.7
Exports of goods and services,':'!: 4.8 5.2 6.2 6.8 6.7 7.4 9.5 12.8
Imports of goods and services 15.2 17.0 14.8 18.9 . 22.1 15.2 16.0 22.4
-- - - -12.1 -- ':7:8 - -:"9:"6~et Foreign ~a1ance -10.4 11.8 -.8.6 15.4 -6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100•.0 100.0 100.0
.Based on GNP series in 1965 constant market prices
~~Inc1udes net" factor income from abroad
Components do not add to total because of small statistical discrepancy
Source:" Bank of Korea, Revision of National Accounts, 1953-66.
-3~-
Table X
,
,Investment and Saving as Shares 'of GNP*
1959 illQ 1961 llil l2ll .~. llli.. 1966,
Gross Domestic . .
Invest~~nt 10.7 ' 10.8 13.1 12.7 18.4 ., 14.5 14.7 21.6
Private 7.0 7.5 8.7 7.5 14.7 10.7 10.8 16.8
Government 3.7 3.3 4.4 5.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.7
Foreign Saving 7.3 8.5 8.5 10.8 10.7 7.1 6.5 8.6
Loans
-.4 -.4 -.6 1.3 3.8 .8 -.2 3.0
Transfers 7.6 8.9 9.1 9.5 6.9 6.3 6.7 5.6
DO'.l1estic Saving 3.4 2.4 4.5 2.2 7.6 7.5 8.2 12.9
. *~ased on current price GNP series
Source: Bank of Korea, Revision of National Accounts, 1953-65
..
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in general and .on concessional assistance io particular.
Such structural ~hanges are widely recognized as essential elements in
the process of transforming an economy from impoverishment and stagnation to
self-sustaining growth. They strike at the barriers to growth recently char-
acterized by Chenery and Strout as the investment, saving and foreign exchange
constraints. The remarkable aspect of Korean experience has been the speed
•
with which these changes have been brought about. Although it is still too
early to conclude that the transformation is irreversable, there is no evidence
. of backsliding and no appar~nt.grounds for anticipating a reversion. If the
current ~atterns do continue, Korea will have moved from a low investment, low
saving and low export economy to a high investor, substantial saver and high
foteign exchange earner in one of the briefest periods of recent record.
The reasons for these rapid changes are several. In part the very unfav-
orable structural relations of the past - the minimal savings and export levels,
the heavy d~pendence on foreign aid to sustain only moderate levels of invest-
ment - meant that even modest improvements looked good by comparison. A fifty
percent increase in exports or savings 'from a very small base is less difficult
than a comparable increase from a large base. Furthermore, the poor performance
of the past was to some extent the result of various policies and institutional
arran~ements which, when removed or changed, contributed to the recovery.
There were also certain underlying strengths in the Korean economy which
were supportative conditions for the rapid growth and structural change. A
'vigorous, rctatlv~ty well-~ducated, reasonably frugal population provided an
abundant and productive labor force. Sizeable unemployment and absence of
unions or other labor organizations have kept real wages· low in relation to
the average prOductivity of labor as compared 'with many other developing countries.
But the main forces which activated the processes of growth and structural
transformation were the series of positive policy measures specifically directed
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toward expanding e~ports, savings and investment, and the weaving together of
economic and political strotegies in a mutually ·supporting manner. These
policies and strategies were not fully articu~ated in advance and introduced
full blown at some given point in time. Rather they were evolved and imple-
mented sequentially as the opportunities for action were pefceived and then
acteH,upon. Not only did the Government move quickly to seize the opportun-
ities but it also moved forcefully. The tendency was to try to overshoot
the mark rather than be caught short in providing incentives for such things
as exports or savings. This probably resulted in some inefficiency in that
policy measures may have been stronger than would hav~ been necessary if there
had been more knowledge or analysis of the particular situation toward which
~he policy was directed. On theother hand, the "overkill" approach did pro-
duce results which have undoubtedly far exceeded their costs. More cautious
'measures might well have failed.
Causes of Structural Change
The Korean approach to removing the investment, saving and import con-
straints . devi a t e.d from 'orthodox lines in recent yellrs with highly favorable
effects. This obviously raise~ some questions.about the appropriateness of
the conventional measures, or the validity of the assumptions on the basis
of which such measures have been recommended.
Accelerating Investment
Orthodox policies to increase investment and improve the allocation
of investment include holding down the costs of capital goods (through favor-
orabl~ exchange rates, tax exemption, direcb subsidies and low interest rates
On longer term loans for investment', doing better.and faster project devel-
opment and appraisal, and improving the organization for implementation of
projects. All of these measures tend to result in greater involvement of
___J
~l:Itil! in the of invel:lt
.' ..
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making and execution. This involvement may be justified on the grounds tha~
market force~ are not a good guide for investment, bu~ this should not obscure
the fact that government decision-making is often slow, costly and conducivc'
to corruption. In particular the foreign assistance agcncies are extremely
slow.moving so that the time lag bctween original proposal and full operation
of major capital projects which they finance is typically 5 to 10 years.
In countries which are growing slowly, such lags may not be serious and
the time spent on nlaking better decisions may be wortlmhile. But when rapid
growth'is occurring, delays in carrying out investments, especially in crit-
ical areas of infrastructure, can stifle the growth process. In such cases,
the growth of demand becomes the primary criterion of investment and the time
dimensions of decision making and implementation are critical.
To speed up the investment process and increasc the total volume of
inves~ment, Korea has tried to increase the general availability of domestic
and foreign credit, including that from private sources which inevitably carries
harder terms, and has moved part way in the direction of market forces rather
than Governmcnt decision-makers as the final arbiter of investment choice. The
specific policy measures employed by Government to encourage the inflow of pri-
vate foreign capital were: guarantee of repayments on foreign loans, liberal
provisions for repatriation of profits and initial investmcnt on foreign equity
capital, tax exemptions On foreign investment, and finally aggressive efforts
by the Government t~ obtilin commitment& of private and semt-put>lic loan& frOl1l
foreign countries. ..
The first moves to stimulate the inflow of foreign capital were taken in
1962 and 1963, resulting in a sizeable inflo~ in the latter year. Then domestic
inflation and preoccupation ~ith counter-inflationary mcasures 'caused a slow-
down of , investment and foreign capital inflow for several years. But in 1965
C',
t.
..
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. '
both domestic and foreign in 1966. In May of 1965 it obtained a commitment
from the United States to provide $150 million of development loans ovcr an
unspecified timc, period, whereupon t~le Korean Government began agitating to
have the full amount committed within one to two years. At about the same
time the decision was made to construct concurrently three large fertilizer
plants costing some $130 million. Two were to be financed by U.S. aid and
American private capital; the third was financed by Japanese private capital.
These three plants were all completed and in operation 'by mid-1967.
The next measure to stimulate savin~s and thus support higher levels of
investment was the general increase in, interest rates which is discussed
below. This was ~pproved by the National Assembly in August, 1965 and imple-
mented at the end of September. Finally, the normalization of relations with
Japan was agreed to in June" 1965, approved by the National Assembly in Augus t
and signed in December. This agreement provided for an inflow of $800 million
of goods and services from,Japan to Korea over a ten year period. It was to
consist of $300 million of property'claims, the same amount of commercial loans
and $200 million of public loans. The fastest moving portion has been the
co~nercial loans.
The Government also accelerated the 'apprO/al process for external financing
and reduced the degree of Government involvement in the investment decision-
making. It would be incorrect to give the impression that the Government
adopted a laissez-faire position on private investment. Rather it moved
back from a pattern of detailed consideration of every such project to a con-
centration on the major projects. rhe burden of responsibility for conceiving
of and aeveloping the smaller-scale projects was shifted to the private investors,
. both domestic and foreign. Government retained the right of approval for all
projects and National Assembly approval was required for those projects on
which foreign repayment was guaranteed by the Korean Reconstruction Bank.
1
r····· ...
TABLE XI
Approvals of Foreign Loans and Investments i.i
,.
(in mi1lions,of dollars) :
:;
~mercial Loan~ Public L~ans ~rect Investment ~~l!l I
!
I
.• I
1959 12.3 12.3 I1
'.
1960 5.0 5.0
1961 3.1 3.1
1962 1.8 52.5 .6 54.9
1963 54.0 9.5 5.4 68.9
1964 61.8 ·37.9 .8 100.6
1965 83'.7 76.6 22.6 182.3
1966 128.6 151.3 13.5 295.4
Total 329.9 348.2 42.9 722.5
..
Source: Economic Planning Board, Major E~~t).dic!.~, March 1967.
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This often led to a.considerab1e amount of politicking and payoff of key Assembly
members and government officials, but the administration managed to push a large
number of approvals through the Assembly in 1965 and 1966.
These measures to increase available savings ~ogether with improved stab-
ility of prices and the exchange rate and continued high grdwth of exports and
,
GNP which strained existing productive capacity, generated both the means and'
the inducements for the sharp rise in investment in 1966 and 1967. It is never-
the1ess remarkable that there has not been more difficulty in carrying out high
levels of investment in those years. Butfue construction industry has apparently
been able to expand rapidly in response to the growth of demand, and much of the
ma~hinery and equipment for. new investment has been imported thereby not resu1t-
ing in demands on the domestic economy. Finally because of tile continued growth
of export earnings, the' initially very 10\01 level of foreign. debt, and the current
availa~ility of foreign capital, the Governme~t h~s been able to let imports
absorb most of the potential inflationary pressure which might have resulted
from rising investment.
It is still too early to assess the effi~iency of this recent investment
being financed by foreign capital, but one gains the impression that the
private decision-makers are basing their assessments on reasonably conserva-
tive estimates of prices and costs, and that the~ are not expecting extensive
.1
i
government subsidy or protection in the future. There is now occurring some
.' '
defaulting on payments to foreign lenders by the private Korean borrowers, so
that the Korean Reconstruction Bank which guarapteed most of this type of loans,
is being forced to cover the repayments. Such defaulting is 'not clear evidence,
however, that the borrowings have been used f~r inefficient investment. It
may merely reflect, at least, in some cases, that the repayment terms were un-
realist~c or even conceivably that the borrowers are forcing the KRB to refinance
their foreign loan so they 'can use current revenues for financing new investment.
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The main problem areas seem to be those where investment. is not being carried
out rapidly enough rather than too rapidly. These are the infrastructure sectors
of electric power, transportation and water supply wl1ere serious shortages were
experienced in 1967. In both power and transportation, extensive sectoral studies
carried out by foreign experts in 1965 and ,1966 had greatly:underestimated the
•
growth of demand. Furthermore the investments in these sectors, which were
being financed by 'foreign governments or inter~ational agencies, were moving
80 slowly that the Korean government was forced to take emergency measures to
increase supply and curtail demand. It was also considering greater use of
non-governmental: Joans for such projects i.n the future primarily to expedite
implementation.
Raising Domestic Saving
The orthodox approach to increased domestic saving is based upon the
propositions that the amount of voluntary private saving will be very limited
and that which will occur will be done mainly by ,the higher income groups out
of expanding profits. Consequently the main emphasis should be on expansion
. of government revenues but with some tax incentives for the most likely sources
of private saving, or, if these are judged inadequate, to resort to inflation.
Also the development of specialized institutions - insurance companies, savings
associations,' securities markets, etc. - which facilitate private saving by
the higher 'income groups is commonly encouraged. On the other hand it has
generally .been assumed that private savings are not very responsive to changes
in the interest rate in poor countries. Even s'taunch advocates of the posi-
tive role of financial institutions in encouraging savings were very cautious
in their prediction of what might be accomplished by raising interest rates
and st~engthening institutions in Korea. (Gurley, Patrick, Shaw" p. ).
They tended to support higher interest rates as much for the potential effect
as on I' , inn nf savin~s.
..
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*Deflated by the wholesale price index to 1960 prices.
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review.
\ .
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the Korean Government, after first having tried credit e~pansion and inflation
in 1962-63 an~ then having undergone the trauma of a severe stabilization exper-
ience in 1963-64, finally in 1965 raised interest rates On bank time deposits
to a maximum of 30 percent, or a real rate of over 20 percent per annum (allowing
for recent and probable inflation), and instituted a campaign to promote savings
in the 'existing banking system. This resulted during the s~osequent two years
in a four-fold increase of such deposits or by an amount equal to about 13
percent of the average GNP for that period. These measures were also a sig-
nificant factor in raising the domestic saving ratio from 7.6 percent to 11.7
percent in one year (from 1965 to 1966). The banking system was resuscitated
and replaced the unorganized money market as the primary source of loanable
·funds •.
, Public revenues also expanded significantly in 1965 and 1966, but in large
. part this was a recovery from the decline in the ratio of revenues to GNP that
oecurred in the two previous years. The increase in government savings that
has taken place in recent years has been achieved as much by cutting back on
the real level of government consumption expenditures as by ~dding to revenues.
This decline in government consumption resulted mainly from the inflation in
1963 and 1964 when government salaries were not adju~ted to the rising price
level., Beginning in 1966 some increase in salaries was provided and this is
~ontinuing so that growth of government savings is constrained accordingly.
Thus the critical factor in raising the national saving rate and supporting
the high level of investment was and will probably continue to be the interest
rate change and related measures affecting private saving.
Removing the Import Constraint
The most COmmon solution to the imp~rt constraint has been to acc~l­
crate the import substitution process so as to reduce, or at least avoid
increases in the ratio of imports to GNP. Although there has been growing
..
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TABLE XIII
Government Taxes, Saving and Consumption as Percent of GNP*
Total Government Government Gover~ment r
Taxes -~~ Consumption
1960 10.0 -2.9 14.4
1961 9.6 -2 •.6 13.5
1962 11.3 -2.4 14.2
1963 9.3 -1.0 11.2
1964 7.8 0 8.9
1965 9.2 1.2 9.4
1966 10.2 2.3 10.2
*Based on the GNP series in current prices rather than constant prices as
in ~arlier tables.
Source: Tax series is from Economic Planning Board, Major Economic Indicators,
March 1967. Government saving series is derived from Revision of
National Accounts, 1953-66.
I
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I
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concern among stud~nts of economic ,development over the efficiency of rapid
import substitution, there has also been widespread skepticism about the expand-
ability or exp~rts by the developing countries. Confronted with this di1emna,
most countries have been advised to follow a selective approach of import sub-
stit~tion and export expansion guided by comparative advantage.
Korea follo~'1ed a purely import substitution strategy in the 1950' sand
rapidly reached the barriers of inefficiency which contributed to the declining
growth rates at the cnd of the decade. In the 1960's, the dominant strategy
has been export expansion, especially for manufactured goods destined for
developed coun~ries. This has resulted in a seven-ford increase in conwodity
exports frOm 1960 to 1966, and a rise in the ratio of goods and services exports
to GNP from 4 percent to 11.4 percent during the same period. The import ratiO,
which had declined as a consequence of import substitution, reduced foreign
aid and slower growth, has recently been rising in response to the high import
needs.of both exports and investr.tent. There has been some continuing import
substitution in such heavy industries as fertilizer, cement and synthetics,
where rapid growth of demand has created markets for new production without
elimination of competitive imports. But in some less efficient industries
import substitution has been restrained by Government to avoid burdening
export industries with high cost intermediate goods. Export producers
continue to be given unlimited access to imported intermediate goods free
of ' all import duties and financed under favorable credit terms. Only the
domestic consumers buy from the high cost domestic producers.
The expansion of exports was encouraged initially by devaluation and
granting exporters favored access to tightly controlled imports. Subsequently
1n 1965 import controls were relaxed '1nd the excess profits from import quotas
largely disappeared. Export incentives were then shifted mainly to favored
access I I I t both low "
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•~ TABLE XIV
Balance of Payments
(million of dollars)
'.'
.,
1960 1963 1966
Receipts Payments Receipts Payments Receipts Payments
Goods and Services 117 379 176 578 455 778
Goods 33 305 87 4?7 250 680
Services 84 . 74 89 81 205 98
Net Goods and
Services 262 403 323
Transfers 282 6 266 7 227 8
Private 21 1 57 5 103 6
Government 261 5 209 2 124 2
Net transfers 276 260 220
Capital
Private 1 3 61 18t.
Government 13 28 34
Central Bank 3 56 119
Net.capita1 and
error 14 145 99
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
, .
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operating and inves.tment cos ts in indus tries producing for export. A secondary
source of incentive was tax exemption, especially on imported ra~ materials
which were to be used for export production. It should be noted that, whereas
the more general investment incentives of low interesc rates and tax exemption
were curtailed, SUCll incentives were made available to those producing for .
,
export and, in so far as possible, were tied specifically to export activities •
.
These differential incentives as between producing for export or. for the domestic
market were probably equivalent to about 10-15 percent in the selling price of
the average con,modi ty.
Foreign exchan~e earnings related to the Vietnam w~r have assunled signif-
icant proportions sin~e 1966. In that year exports of goods and services from
Korea to Vietnam are reported to have been $36 million or 8 percent of total
current account receipts. Remittances from civilian and military personnel
.stationed in Vietnam vIere another $23 million or nearly one fourth of private
transfer receipts. In ,the first half of 1967 such earnings were running about
double the 1966 rate, so they may reach $120 million out of. prospective total
current account and private transfer receipts of perhaps $800 million, or nearly
15 percent of such receipts. Thus while the effects of the Vietnam war on
. Korea's balance of payments are growing, they have not yet become a dominant
factor nor, with the growth of regular exports or foreign capital inflow,
are they likely to become so.
The Korean Government played a very active role in promoting exports.
It set high targets for the growth of exports ~nd then raised these targets
further as p~rformance exceeded expectations~ The targets were broken down
into sectoral and even plant quotas and producers were exhorted and assisted
in various ways to meet and exceed their quotas. Also the Korean embassies
and consulates abroad were given quotas and pushed into export promotion.
Thus exports b:.'Cane a national campaign carri£!d out jointly by Government and
C,·
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business. It was a campaign in which the proximate indicators of success, the
actual levels of exports, were clear, although the o\ore difficult measures of
real costs and benefits to the economy were somewhat less c~~tain. Neverthe-
less the balance of payments was obviously strengthened, industrial production
and i:nves tmen t were stimulated, profits and employment grew and the Government
. was encouraged by thes.e tangible indicators of achievement.
"
In essence, Korea has relied upon the efficiency and speed of private
investment decisions and private capital inflow, the expansion possibilities
of manufactured exports, and the interest elasticity of private .savings as
"the ~hree main.devices for overcoming bar.riers to growth. It would be
incorrect to imply that""these were the only elements of the growth strategy
or that they were responsible for all the growth and structural change which
has occurred. But" they have probably made the difference between good Gud
exceptional performance.
The Korean development s~rategy, emphasizing demand-oriented investment,
inducements Jor private foreign capital, high interest rates for private
saving and incentives for exports, had important political implications which
were quite different from those associated with the more customary strategy.
1
Whereas the traditional empha~ involves government allocation of under-
priced foreign assistance funds and import licenses, as well as strong tax
enforcement and high tariffs on imports, the Korean program has generated
larger amounts of more realistically priced foreign exchange with less need
for government allocation, and a system of rew4rds for savers and exporters.
This has transformed the role of government to some extent from that of
policeman to that of partner. The Government has helped to secure additional
eoornitments of foreign financing; it has raised the incomes of those who save
and those who produce for export; it has been active in trying to reo\ove the
barriers to obtaining raw materials, finding export markets, and enerally
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improving the efficiency of operations of export producers. There are still
many areas in which the Government seems to be more an adversary than an
associate, but the balance has. shifted to a degree and effects on the attitudes
of the general populous toward the bureaucracy have been favorable.
It has obviously been difficult for the bureaucracy to"give up many of
.,
the sources of income deriving from controls over import licensing and bank
lending, especially at a time when government salaries had not recovered from
recent inflation. That the Government was able to cut back.on such controls
and develop a more positive· relation ",ith the private sec tor was probably due
to strong Government leadership, a nationalistic or public spirited response
of the bureaucracy when they Sat" that the changes were actually accomplishing
something in. terms of groNth, and undoubtedly som~ ingenuity in discovering
new sources of income to replace that previously derived from adnlinistering
·the controls.
Economic Planning
Economic planning has recently achieved an important economic and pol-
itical role in Korea. During the Synghman Rhee era such planning was viewed
as socialistic or communistic and eschewed as a symbol of the evils of North
Korea. The military government was co~~itted to longer-term planning, but
its early efforts were hurried and poorly formulated so that numerous revisIons
were nece~sary and the public had little confidence in tile process. Despite
this background the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan in 1965 ~nd 1966
proved to be a significant factor in drawing together the forces for political
.and economic development. there was much public interest in the Second Plan,
when it was issued, and the Government was g~nerally credited with having
produced a reasonably hones.~ assessment of past progress and failures and
a credible plotting of' the future.
.'
_____1..
atinp- the Second
...
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fl:onl that of the First. The earlier Plan prepared on a crash basis in 1961
after the military coup, had combined som~ arbitrary estimates of overall
growth wit11 a detailed listing of prospective projects resembling the proverbial
shopping· list. The Second Plan was less concerned with the overall growth rate.
Instead it gave greater emphasis to the grot-lth paths of the 'various productive
" .
sectors, the main lines of policy, the criteria for investment, and left many
of the specific decisions abou~ individual projects for subsequent consideration.
This approach was compatible with increased reliance on private investment
decisions by both Koreans and foreigners. It was al~o realistic in light of
the expectations of continuing high growth and structural change, but with
considerable uncertainty about relative rates of change.
One of the main factors contributing to this uncertainty was that as the
Plan was being prepared the national income and product accounts were con-
·currently undergoing a series of revisions to correct for some se~ious past
errors in estimation. 'This .meant that there were no consistent and reliable
longer-run time series of the principal statistics for projecting many of the
critical variables affecting growth. While this is generally a serious
handicap for planning it may have been somewhat less critical at the partic-
ular juncture of Korean development because of the major structural changes
which were occurring in 1965 and 1966. If there had been better inf~rmation
on the patl~s over which the economy had moved in the past. there might have
been less inclination to accept some of the more optimistic prospects of
future ~evelopment.
It bad been generally accepted that the.growth target of the First Plan,
an average annual increase of GNP of 7.1 percen~ w~s derived not from any
serious economic analysis, much less from extrapolating past trends, but was
set, on political grounds, slightly above the North Korean growth target of
7 percent. After the South Korean Plan was made public at the end of 1961,
I .
'....- .
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it' was criticized by the World Bank and an American consult~ng firm as being
unrealistic. Consequently Korean p;anners undertook to prepare a revised
version of the Plan which was completed in 1964 based oa a 5 percent growth
target. It is clear that these targets had little impact on the actual
performance of the economy or the policy and allocation declsions of the
Government. Of greater significance may have been the political consequences
of having acknowledged that the Plan was unrealistic. Subsequently, however,
this process was reversed because the actual growth rate rose, from 1963 on,
and by 1965 it appeared that the growth targets of the original 7.1 percent
Plan werre likely to be e,~ceeded. The Government thereupon forgot about the
downward revision and began to claim credit for the success of the original
Plan.
All of this "Plansmanship" did little to engender conUdeuce in the plau-
ning process. It is all the more significant therefore that the Second Plan
received as favorable a reception as it did in the academic,press and business
communf.ties.· Despite so~e initial criticisms from the lvorld Bank that the
output, export and domestic savings targets were too high, most knowledgeable
Koreans were inclined to assume that progr~ss in these key areas would not
diminish and that plan ~argets were attainable. Leading offiCials, includ-
ing the President, were desireous of setting attainable targets for the
Second Plan so they would not subsequently be charged with failure, but
they were also unwilling to be timid.
Perhaps the key role of the Second Plan was that it served to confirm
to the Korean populace that the very recent ·indications of good performance
of the Korean econo;ny were reasonably accurate and' furthermore that this
was not just a transient phenomenon -- an upswing of a cycle -- but was a new
longer-run trend that cpuld lead the country to much greater well-being'
•"
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of most Koreans about the viability and growth potential of the South Korean
.
economy, and also a justifiable suspicion of official statistics as being
adjusted to serve the particular interests of those in power. But the
people -- even the outspoken critics in the press and academic community
seemed to have.more confidence in the reliability of, and motives behind,
the Second Plan. They could perceive signs of improved conditions in their
daily lives. The Plan acknowledged some of the deficiencies of current
statistics and was based mainly on those statistics 'Nhich seemed more
reliable such as the new interindustry tables and foreign trade statistics.
Many persons were involved in the preparati,on of the Plan including various
fo~eign advisory groups and some academic economists and planners, so that it
was not simply another government document conceived in secret. The publiC,
although not extensively involved in the plan formulntio~ proce~s wnr. ~t
'least made aware over a considerable period that the Plan was in preparation
and also what some of the main lines were likely to be. Then after the
Plan was issued, the senior planning officials carried out an effective
program to explain and support it. Finally the projected targets did not
seem unreasonable in vie~-l of the changes then occurring in the economy.
The Plan indicated that, if these very recent trends continued, tIle
country could bring its internal and external (or saving and import) gaps
down to manageable proportions, terminate dependence on U.S. grant assis-
tance and still achieve roughly a 20 percent increase in per capita con-
sumption over the Plan period. Such accomplish~ents would have surely
been judged incredible or unrealistic one or two years previously. But
the expectations embodied in the Plan were giv~n further backing by the
very high gro~lth of the economy in 1966 SO that, even before the new Plan
period s~arted in 'l96~ consideration was being given to raising the
targets by as nluch as 50 pt'rcent. This was a very di.ffercnt popular
reception 'frOm that given to the First Plan.
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Conclusion
The return to civi1ia~ government and the achievement of consistent high
levels of ecor.omic growth l-lere' the t\-lO prominent trends in Korean development
after 1962. They proceeded together and interacted greatly upon one another.
The ~ignificance of the changes· in the economic and politic'l development
. spheres respectively, however, were of a different nature. In the economic
area, there was a "quantum jump" from a condition of stagnation and dependency
to one of high levels of growth and rapid reductions in the relative importance
of concessionary aid. These chRnges were being sustained by structural reforms,
revitalization of key institutions such as the banking sector, less restrictive
and more effective administration of economic affairs and more relevant economic
planning. In the political area, inst1tutional changes were less sweeping.
But, of overriding significance, the period salol the solution of one of the majol'
postwar problems of Korean political development. Influenced most of all by
the economic transformation t~king place"the belief in a South Korean state
one that would not only survive but grow as an independent volitieal and
economic entity -- became widespread For the first time this formed the
basis for setting national priorities and for popular response to political
.,
issues. It thus laid the basis for the achievement of a genuine political
'consensus by 1967 based on national development, and for the accomodation
of political disputes which threatened political stability and the continua-
tion of this development.
The main accompl ishments 1n the direction pf economic deve lopm£!nt hac!.
been achieved by strong Government actions in organizing the resources to
moderni~e agriculture, changing the incentive structure for industrial production
and 'inves tmcnt, and marshall ing the resources for inves tmen t. Some of these
measures were vi.owed with skepticism or openly opposed wh,cn instituted, ~ut,
,
f\ ....
-59-
The programs and policies tV'cre des igned to correct extreme imbalances in
the economy and put the country on a high grotV'th path in a hurry. This they
have succeeded in doin&. The results attest to the general soundness of the
. ;
policies which had been mainly conceived by the civilian technicians in the
Gover~ment. 'But the implementation of these strong measures~depended, at
least initially on the strength and authoritarian instincts of the Government.
Subsequently as popular attitudes and practices adapted to the policies -- as
farmers have come to recognize the benefits of mixed fertilizer and limestone,
or as savers have shifted their patrona g c from the unorgani2:ed savings associations
to the banks -- the Government has softened its approa~h. thus the populous
has not only benefited from the· growth of output and income, but has witnessed
a liberalizing of govcrnlnent actions and is gaining increasing confidence that
these two trends will continue.
While it would appear that the structural relations of the economy have
been r~a]ligned in a pattern which would support hi&l growth and rapid elimin-
ation of th~.need for concessional foreign capital, and thus greater economic
and political independence, there are a number of danger signals and potential
pitfalls of a predominantly economic nature which could undercut the new pattern.
While the growth of exports must eventually slotV' down, the economy is now
preparing for rapid expansion over the next few years. If any major new barriers
to K~rean exports were imposed these plans could be frustrated and the invest-
ment boom terminated. Fortunately Korea is still a small enough supplier in
~t markets tn avoid actions directed apecific~~ly against it~ commo4tti~s.
Also Korea has not yet penetrated the protective barriers around Japanese manu-
factured goods. If these barriers shou14 be reduced, as a result of direct
Korean efforts or broader UNCTAD negotiations, Korean exports ~~uld r~ceivc
a major new stimulus. Still over the longer run, the export prospects se~m
promising and as the export levels reach 15 to 20 percent of GNP, the emphnsis
should shift to more balanced -expAnsion of exports nnd i.mport sub'otitutes or
.1
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new products for the domestic economy.
Continued expansion of public revenues will be needed to support the large
army, raise compensation levels of both the army and the bureaucracy, and support
part of the costs of public investment. It will be easier to raise such revenues,
if personal income is growing rapidly .and the public i.; satisfied with the general
0
0
performance of government and the specific benefits deriving from the public expend-
itureso
t·
t
AltJtough the statistics are not available to see clearly what has been happening,
it is obvious that the entrepreneurial group has been expanding and improving its
overall efficiency at a rapid rate. A~so employment in industry and services
has been rising at probably 10 to 15 percent per year. It is difficult to .
foresee any shortages of entrepreneurs, technicians or workers with special
skills, but these could conc~ivably arise and begin to impinge on growth. Also
the evolution of the industrial labor force in regard to the degree of unionizn-
tion and the pressure for higher real wages may create tensions within the society
and affect the inflow of foreign investment. So far real wage rates have not
increased very much and the main benefits which workers have gained from rapid
groto1th have been through increased employment. This will probably continue
for several years. However, as the margin of unemploycd is reduced, the pres-
sures for wage increases \01111 build up. While the economy should then bc able
to accomodate rising wages, the test may be over the manner in which they are
achieved.
This listing of what appear to be the major economic problems for 'the future
shows that most such problems are not as yet vary well defined or pressing. Thcre
are some current difficulties of management and balance in an economy that is
moving ahead SO rapidly but these should be expected and should be manageable
so long as the com.nitment to development and a sufficicnt degree of political
order can be maintained.
",-,'
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Much of the new political stability ~nd the concentrated attention on econo-
roic problems, has nevertheless rested upon 'the ~trong leadership and balancing
ability of President Park \-lho .is constitutionally barred from re-election in 1971.
The degree to \'1hich this ne\J approach and emphasis has become institutionalized in
the political process is still questionable, although undou~tedly some steps in
this direction have been taken. The strengthening of the professionally-oriented
bureaucracy and its increasingly sophisticated management of economic affairs is
one of these steps. The bureaucracy, and a growing body of senior civilian ad-
ministrators of general rather than partisan prestige, provide a potential ally
to any Executive desiring to maintain this developmental emphasis against
narrowly partisan interests. On the other hand, the political parties which
'should carry nruch of the burden of translating the recent change in outlook into
political practices and principles have not been in the forefront of recent de-
·velopments. The Covernment party, quite strongly organized, has performed a
very valuable role in providing the Government the legal means for carrying its
programs through the legislature and also as an absorptive element for the
various interests that have sought accomodation with the new Government. The
Opposition, for all its internal agonies, has served as a reasonably congealed
form of dissent at critical junctures. But the pdrties.remain the repository
.of factional rather than national or even indentifiable group interest. Formed
from the top, with ntoro opportunistic then ideological bonds holding them to-
gether, they were the bete noire of the rigged legislative elections of 1967
whic~ seamed ~cn ~ throwbuck to pG11t1es of an earlier era.
The military also remains a k~y prob~em. Having entered politics once,
and established thereby a channel for continuing infl\lence in politics, the
military is unUkely to remain indifferent to the election of a regime hostile
to it or to any major crisis in national stability. The present Goverrunent
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Party channels, it has tllUS been able to protect its rear, so to speak, as it
gradually accepted tIle restraints and intricacies of civilian government. But
to the degree that the Government remains a special outlet for military in-
fluence, it weakens its ability -- particularly that of the Goverruncnt Party --
to establish itself as a predominantly popular-based institu~ion. On the other
. hand,' the Dlore it docs seek' to represent a set of specific civilian interests
the more it r·isks its special relationship 'lrlith the military and thus one of its
greatest assets, i.e., the ability to assure the country civilian rule free from
the thrent of direct military intervention. The opposition has a similar prob-
lem. By challenging the Government on the latter's close military ties, it
appeals to many clements who favor more civilian and more democratic politics.
But at the same time it raises the question in many minds as to whether the
Opposition could survive in power. This was likely a significant fActor in
"its loss in the last two elections.
The size of the Korean military.presents a special problem in itself.
Until recently the costs of this 600,000 man force were largely borne by
US aid. But reductions in US economic and military assistance in recent years
have pushed this cost increasingly on to the Korean economy. The reduction
of forces was a very touchy and dangerous issue for the Chang ~~on Govcrruncnt
of 1960 and will be for any regime in the future. Yet it may 100m large as
SOon as the Vietnam war ends when two divisions of Korean troops, now funded
by special US aid related to Vietnam, return home.
The parties, tIle legislature, and other civil institutions are thus a11
weatt in development compared to the military 'and the bureaUC1"acy. l'hey are
also less well developed in some respects than the press and the students wh'o' -- ..
on questi.ons of political liberty -- are probably Dlore influential than any
other civil institutions. But the weakness of these institutions will not
recent emphasis on mitional
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and particularly economic development ~lich
had created such a new tone in national pol~tics'by 1967.
Economic emphasis in the future cannot be e:~pected to have quite the same
impact on politics as in the recent pest when the basic question of whether,
that economic growth is now accepted as a tangible reality, and will remain
Korea could go anywhere economically was being answered. B~t it is also true
;
I
for some time as one of the few tangible bases for national consensus. Thus •
maintaining relatively high rates of growth will continue to be one of the major •
political requirements of any regime. This has tlolO important ramifications.
One is that the civilian admi.ni.strators and the bUl:eaucracy - .. and increasingly
private economic groups such as business -- will have to have prominent roles
in any future government. Without a very major crisis, in other words, a
return to a purely military experiment, such as that of 1961-62, is unlikely.
'Second, it puts practical limitations on the uses to which the economic assets
of the country can be subverteu to strictly partisan political use. It is
questionable for example, that a repetition could occur of the Liberal Party
excesses of 1958-60, when nearly all government operations and leverage were
turned toward retainine the Liberals in power at serious cost to the economy.
Finally, as long as economic development remains a nl?jor political factor,
there will be a continuing incentive for accomodation between the authoritarian
drives of a strong Executi,ve and the volatile defense of democracy among the
press and intellectual cOIMlunity in the'mutual desire to stave off serious in-
stability. However valid it may be in fact -- and in Korea's case it has some
validity the belief is widespread in Korea that political stability has
been one of the major factors in the recent economic upsurge.
Economic development, moreover, is unlikely to produce serious divisive
or destabilizing effects in the course of the next five or even te~ years.
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This competition is already handled rather effectively through the Assembly
which at least vocalizcs a strong rural int~rest while subject to all the
pressures of rapidly expanding urba~/industrial interests -- and within the
Executive. Other special interest groups are unlikely to bcconle very strong •
.
Labor is kept weak by Government control and by the pressure.s of unemployment
whicH discourage a heavy push on wages. Small farmers could become a serious
economic proolem a~ the agricultural sector continues to modernize. But the
opportunities for political organization among them are slim, and the lure of
the urban areas will provide a 'continuous outlet. Expanding business opportuni-
ties are beginning to relieve the pressure for satisfying the' job requirements
of the large number of college graduat,es. In other \olords, for se \~ral years
to come, overall economic development -- which touches most groups -- will
continue to be morc a b~sis for consensus than the source o~ divisive com-
petition. The economic theme can thus continue to be a stabilizing and con-
structive force in politics.
Looking to the future, therefore, .general economic gro~"l:h and maintenance
of at least minimum democratic processes will remain the two principal para-
meters of Korean political development and stability for some time. They will
remain so in largely gencral terms with qualitative questions of development
(such ~s the distr~bution of income) and more definitive concepts of democratic
rule (such as a more co~plete freedom of ideas and organization beyond the
formal political .structure) only slo~.,ly becoming influential in shaping and
differentiating political organizations and outlook. In part ~\is ~~fl~ts·
the lack of firmly organized economic interes·t groups and in part the still
vague and generalized ideas of both the polit~cal and academic leaders about
the desirable future of KoreD;n poli.ti.cs. This provides over all a rather.
positive if sti.U' not sharply defined frame~o1ork for the further development
• !
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and stability of deve!opment along these lines will depend for some time still
on the skills and commitments of the. 1eader~;llip, particularly that lolhich succeeds
to power in 1971.
."
